One plant, many different gases
A single unit can handle a light hydrocarbon, a heavy solvent vapour and a toxic gas at once. No single sensing technology covers all three, so the layout has to be built from the inventory outward.
Toxic and flammable gas monitoring, optical flame detection and emergency shutdown integration for chemical process plants and storage.
A chemical plant is not one hazard. It is a dozen of them sharing a fence line — a light hydrocarbon in one unit, a heavy solvent vapour in the next, a toxic gas in the third, and a hydrogen line running past all of them. Fire and gas detection designed against the site as a category rather than against the inventory as a list will always leave something uncovered.
ZE-Tronics designs, supplies and maintains detection, suppression, notification and safety control systems for petrochemical and chemical facilities, and starts from the substances the process actually handles, the conditions they are handled under, and the area classification that follows from both.
Hazardous areas are classified by what is present, how much of it, and how often. NFPA 70 Article 500 divides them into Class I for flammable gases and vapours, Class II for combustible dust and Class III for ignitable fibres and flyings, each split into Division 1 and Division 2. Article 505 offers the Zone system aligned with IEC 60079 — Zone 0 where a flammable atmosphere is present continuously or for long periods, Zone 1 where it is likely in normal operation, Zone 2 where it is unlikely and short-lived.
That classification decides everything downstream: which protection concept the equipment must use, which temperature class it must carry, and which certificate is acceptable. Electrical equipment is itself an ignition source, so where it cannot be kept out of the classified area it has to be explosion-proof, purged and pressurised, or intrinsically safe. We work in both the Division and the Zone systems and will state plainly which one a given certificate satisfies.
Gas detection is the first line of defence, because it warns before there is anything to ignite. Which technology to use is a per-area decision, not a site-wide one.
Placement follows the gas, not the drawing. Vapours heavier than air collect in pits, trenches, sumps, bunds and under equipment skids; detection mounted at head height will report clean air while a flammable layer builds below it. Lighter gases do the reverse. Toxic detection is placed where people breathe; combustible detection is placed where an ignitable accumulation forms. They are rarely the same height.
Where a fire develops fast and the consequence of a delayed response is severe, radiant energy detection is specified alongside gas detection. NFPA 72 lists what has to be considered when selecting and siting flame detectors: the size of fire to be detected, the fuel involved, detector sensitivity and field of view, the distance between fire and detector, atmospheric absorption of radiant energy, and the presence of external radiation sources that could cause a false alarm.
That last point is what separates a working installation from a disabled one. A plant with flare stacks, hot surfaces, arc welding and direct sun has plenty of sources that look like fire to a poorly chosen detector. Multi-spectrum infrared and UV/IR combinations exist precisely to discriminate between them, and we select and orient detectors so the system keeps its credibility.
Detection has to lead to action. We engineer the release logic as carefully as the detection layout — confirmed voting arrangements so a single sensor fault cannot dump an agent, clear manual override, and interfaces to the process shutdown and emergency shutdown hierarchy that are documented and testable.
Third-party certification matters more in this sector than almost any other. A manufacturer’s self-declaration says the product met an internal test; an accredited certification body’s mark says an independent laboratory verified it. For performance, that means FM, UL and other nationally recognised testing laboratories; for functional safety, exida, TÜV Rheinland and UL. We supply original equipment from authorised manufacturer partnerships and provide the certificates against the specification, rather than an equivalent that will be argued about at handover.
The failure mode of a chemical plant fire and gas system is rarely dramatic. It is a slow accumulation of bypassed loops, overdue calibrations and alarms nobody trusts. Our in-house AZS ISO/IEC 17025:2020 accredited laboratory calibrates both fixed and portable gas detection with traceable results, our electronics repair bench restores detectors and controllers in country, and our maintenance regimes are built around drift history rather than a generic calendar.
Explore our engineering and calibration services, or send us your area classification drawings for review.
A single unit can handle a light hydrocarbon, a heavy solvent vapour and a toxic gas at once. No single sensing technology covers all three, so the layout has to be built from the inventory outward.
Heavy vapours collect in pits, trenches, sumps and under equipment skids. Detection placed at head height reports clean air while a flammable layer builds below it.
Where electrical equipment cannot be kept out of the classified area, it has to be explosion-proof, purged and pressurised, or intrinsically safe — and its surface temperature class has to match the gas group.
A system that nuisance-alarms teaches operators to disregard it. Sensor selection, siting and voting logic decide whether an alarm carries weight when it matters.
Fire and gas systems fail at the handover points between vendors. We own every step, so there are none.
By the gas and by the environment. Infrared sensors are stable, do not poison and fail safe on optics, but they cannot detect hydrogen. Catalytic sensors detect virtually every known combustible gas including hydrogen, but they drift and can be poisoned by silicones and sulphur compounds. Many plants need both, and we specify per area rather than per site.
They are two ways of describing the same hazard. NFPA 70 Article 500 uses Class and Division; Article 505 uses the Zone system aligned with IEC 60079. Zone 0 means a flammable atmosphere is present continuously or for long periods, Zone 1 that it is likely in normal operation, Zone 2 that it is unlikely and short-lived if it occurs. We work in both systems and will state which one a given equipment certificate satisfies.
We can survey it, document what protection concept each item actually uses, identify non-compliances against IEC 60079 and the plant's own area classification drawings, and produce a remediation scope. Formal certification is issued by accredited bodies; our role is to make the installation defensible and to carry out the corrective work.
Yes. Toxic and combustible detection are usually specified together but designed differently — toxic detection protects people at the point they breathe, combustible detection protects the asset from an ignitable accumulation. Detector heights, alarm levels and response actions all differ.
The regulatory answer is per the manufacturer and the AHJ; the practical answer is based on drift history. Once a detector population has a calibration record, intervals can be justified rather than guessed. Our accredited laboratory maintains that record for the equipment we support.
Send us a plot plan, an equipment list or a scope of work. Our engineers reply within one business day.
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